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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18252 
JACK DONALDSON, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NA:TURE OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from his conviction 
for the crime of issuing a check against insuffi-
cient funds in violation of 76-20-11, U.C.A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted upon a non-jury 
trial, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was tried without jury on 21 
March 1963. The evidence disclosed that on 5 March 
-1 
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1962 the appellant entered the Cash Saver Service 
Station in Salt Lake County to purchase gasoline 
(R-14, 15). The service station was operated by 
Mr. John Wilson ( R-14, 15). 'The appellant pur-
chased a tank of gasoline for his automobile (R-15). 
After the tank was filled, the appellant asked Mr. 
Wilson if he would take a "check" (R-15), and Mr. 
Wilson said he would. 'The 'appellant then wrote out 
Exhibit S-1 in the sum of $:25.00. Exhib'it S-1 is 'a 
blank check drawn upon the First Security Bank, 
Ogden, Utah, Main Branch. The space provided 
for the payee was left blank, but both written words 
and figures show· the instrument to be made out 
for $2'5.00. The instrument was signed by the ap-
pellant a's dl'lawer. Mr. Wilson endorsed the instru-
ment on the back and persented the instrument for 
collectinn. The purported check was returned to 
Mr. Wilson by the bank, which indicated that they 
were unable to locate any account for appellant (R. 
17). Mr. Wilson indicated that the appellant made· 
no request that he hold the instrument, which was 
dated 3 March 1962 ( R. 18). 
It was further stipulated that no record of an 
account for appellant could be found in the main 
Ogden Bl'lanch of the First Security Bank during 
the time in question, and that the appellant had 
made admissions to a Salt Lake County Sheriff 
that he had written Exhibit S-1 and that he knew 
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when he wrote it that he did not have an account at 
the bank (R-22). 
During the course of the trial, appellant ob-
jected to the admission of Exhibit S-1 on the grounds 
that no payee was named on the check. The court 
admitted the exhibit over appellant's objection. 
Based on the above evidence, the trral court entered 
a judgment of guilty. 
ARGUMEN;T 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EX-
HIBIT S-1 INTO EVIDENCE SINCE: 
A. EXHIBIT S-1 WAS RELEVANT AND MATERI-
AL TO THE CASE. 
B. THE EXHIBIT IS IN FACT A CHE'CK SINCE: 
1. IT IS A BEARE'R INSTRUMENT; OR 
2. IT WAS PRESENTE'D TO SOMEONE WHO 
HAD AUTHORITY TO TREAT IT AS A 
CHECK. 
C. APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE A 
CHECK WHICH IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTI-
TUTE AN OFFENSE UNDER 76-20~11, U.C.A. 
1953, AS AFFECTED BY 76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953. 
A. It is argued by the appellant that the trial 
court improperly admitted Exhibit S-1 into evi-
dence. The essence of appellant's contention is that, 
since the purported check did not contain a named 
payee, it was not a "check" within the meaning of 
that term as used in the statute 76-20-11, U.C.A., 
1953 and, therefore, should not have been admitted. 
I It is submitted that the nature of the appellant's 
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contention is erroneous in that he confuses the ques-
tion of admissibility of evidence with the question 
of sufficiency of evidence. 
Evidence i1s generally admissible if it is rele-
vant or rna terial to the issues of the case and not 
otherwise prejudicial. Abbott, Criminal Trial Prac-
tice, 4th Ed. § 448. Since Exhibit S-1 was identified 
as the instrument which the appellant presented 
in payment for his gasoline, and was 'an essential 
i tern of the corpus of the case, it was directly rele-
vant and material and, therefore, admissible. 
Since the appellant has only preserved the is-
sue of the admissibility of Exhibit S-1 on appeal, 
the case should be affirmed without considering 
whether Exhibit S-1 as written is legally a check. 
B.-1. Appellant contends Exhibit S-1 is not 
a "check" within the maning of 76-20-11, U.C.A. 
1953, because no payee was designated. He relies 
upon two cases, People v. Nickols, 391 Ill. 565, 63 
N.E. 2d 759 ( 1945) and State v. Ivey, 248 N.C. 316, 
103 S.E.2d 3'9'8 (19'58), and apparently concludes 
that these are the only cases applicable and that they 
are contrary to the position that an instrument like 
S-1 could be a check. As will be shown, these two 
cases are a distinct numerical minority if they, in 
fact, stand for the proposition urged, and actually 
not truly supportive of the position urged. 
In People v. Nickols, supra, the defendant was 
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charged by indictment with having forged a check 
payable to "Harry E. Crow"; however the check 
\vhich was set out in the indictment showed no payee. 
The court held the indictment fatal, noting: 
"After alleging in the purport clause of 
the indictment that the instrument forged 
purported to be a check payable to Harry E. 
Crow, the tenor clause shows that it was not 
a check at all, and that it did not purport 
to be a check payable to Harry E. Crow. It 
was not necessary, of course, that the indict-
ment describe the instrument both by its pur-
port and by its tenor, yet where it attempts 
to do so, the two descriptions must be con-
sistent and it must appear from the face of 
the indictment that they refer to the same 
instrument. * * *" 
"It is apparent, therefore, that there is 
a fatal variance between the purport clause 
and the tenor clause of the indictment, in the 
description of the instrument alleged to have 
been forged. * * *" 
The court did not purport to hold that a check 
where the payee has been left blank is not in fact 
a check, although some unreasoned and unsupported 
dicta in the case support such an inference. Con-
sequently, the holding of the Nickols case does not 
1 truly support the appellant's contention. 
In State v. lvey, supra, also relied upon by ap-
pellant, the defendant was charged with "giving" 
a worthless check. The court in no part of its deci-
sion says that an instrument may not be a check 
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where the payee is left blank. To the contr.a.ry, the 
court had before it a document already showing a 
payee. However, defendant contended that he signed 
a blank instrument and "did not authorize" any-
one to fill it in. The court reversed because of an 
instructional error by the trial court as to the effect 
of signing a bllank check, where the defendant did 
not authorize its completion or intend it as a check. 
Consequently, neither case is really precedent on 
the proposition for which it is urged. 
In the instant case, the appellant delivered 
what he called a "check", and which was complete 
in all parts except no specific payee was named. It 
is submitted that this is a bearer instrument. 44-1-
10, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"An instrument is pa.yable to bearer: 
"1. When it is expressed to be so pay-
able; or, 
* * *" 
The appellant apparently feels this requires 
that the instrument actually contain the word 
"bearer" before it is so expressed. As will be seen, 
this is too narrow a construction. Any expression 
which is sufficient to indicate that the drawer in-
tended an unrestricted payee is sufficient. This can 
be done in several ways, some of which are common. 
First, by writing "cash," State v. Simon, 269 S.W. 
95 (Tex. Cr. 1925) ; secondly, by writing "blank" 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or merely leaving a blank; or, third, by writing 
".John Doe" or "holder". Numerous possibilities 
exist. To hold that 44-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, required 
a specific bearer expression would be contrary to 
accepted commercial practice, provide an easy means 
to avoid criminallia:bility for worthless checks, and 
finally would render as surplusage the language in 
subsection 2. of 44-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, which pro-
vides that an instrument is payable to bearer: 
"* • • 
2. When it is payable to a person named 
therein or to bearer." 
Finally, the case law and authorities are square-
ly to the contrary. In 8 Corpus Juris, § '287, p. 170, 
it is noted: 
''The payee's name may be left blank, 
which m'akes the instrument payable in effect 
to bearer, and in su~h case the blank may be 
filled in by the holder." 
A similar statement is found in 10 C.J.S., 
Bills and Notes, § 120, with additional citations. In 
Finleyv. Rose, 189 Ky. 359,224 S.W.1059 (1920), 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals remarked: 
uThe rule is well settled that the name 
of the payee may be left blank, which makes 
the instrument payable to bearer. * * *" 
Many other cases, civil in nature, have so held. 
Enid Bank and Trust Co. v. Yandell, 56 P.2d 835 
(Okla. 1936); Schuster v. Bown, 97 Cal. App.2d 
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803, 218 P.2d 836; Li Rocchi v. Kee?'b, 127 So.2d 44 
(La. App.); Steel v. Rathbun, 42 Fed. 390 (1890); 
Dunham v. Clogg, 30 Md. 284; Dinsmore v. Duncan, 
47 N.Y. 573, 15 Am. Rep. 534; Fretwell v. Carter, 
78 S.C. 531, 59 S.E. 639; Wookey v. Pole, (Eng.) 
Reprint 839. Britton, Bills and Notes, 2nd Eel.. p. 
196, notes: 
"* * * Formerly, the holder was required to 
fill in his name as a condition precedent to 
his right to sue upon the instrument but he 
may now declare upon such an incomplete 
instrument as one payable to bearer." 
Since the rule is well settled civilly, the appel-
lant would only be en ti tied to relief if there were 
some overriding reasons in the criminal law for not 
following the civil rule. Since both civil and crim-
inal law are aimed at commercial protection in this 
area, the criminal rule is the same as the civil rule 
noted ·above. 
In People v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341, 99 Pac. 
391 (1908), the defendant g.ave a check in payment 
for a piano, but left the payee's name blank. The 
company filled in the blank, but before further 
negotiation determined the check to be fl'!audulent. 
The defendant appealed her conviction on the ground 
that the check 1at the time of delivery did not con-
tain the name of a payee, and hence could not be 
"a check or other document within the meaning of 
section 476" of the California Penal Code. The Cal-
ifornia Court rejected the contention, noting: 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ld: • • The effect of such paper until the name 
of the payee is inserted pursuant to the auth-
ority conferred upon the receiver by its de-
livery for value is that it is payable to the 
bearer and passes from hand to hand by mere 
delivct·y. Under our view there is no merit 
in appellant's contention." 
In Harding v. State, '54 Indiana 359 (1876), 
the appellant was charged with forgery where the 
alleged forged note did not contain the name of a 
payee. The Indi~ana Court rejected the contention 
now n1ade by appellant and affirmed the conviction, 
noting: 
"But if there should be a blank space left for 
the nan1e of the payee, in a written instrument 
\Vhich has all the other requisites of a prom-
issory note, such an instrument may well he 
termed a promissory note, even in an indict-
ment for forgery of such instrument." 
In State v. Campbell, 219 P.2d 956 (Idaho 
1950), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a con-
,·iction where the payee's name had been left blank. 
The court ruled: 
"The check in question was in blank as 
to the name of the payee. Appellant therefore 
contends that it was not a completed check 
and did not fall within the statute. In People 
v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341, 99 P. 391, the 
court decided a similar question contrary to 
appellant's contention. The gist of the court's 
decision as contained in Headnote No.1, reads 
as follows: 'Leaving blank the name of the 
payee of a check gives to any bona fide holder 
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for value implied authority to fill the blank 
with his own name or that of a third person, 
and so, likewise, where all that was required 
to m1ake a check out of a forged instrument 
delivered by defendant in payment was the 
insertion of the name of the payee, the de-
livery constituted the transferee defendant's 
agent with authority to fill in the blank with 
its own name ; and a claim that the instru-
ment was not a check or an instrument for 
the payment of money within the meaning of 
Pen. Code, § 476, when passed by defendant, 
is without merit.' 
"A check made payable in bLank is pay-
able to bearer and the blank may be filled in 
by the holder. Enid Bank & Trust Co. v. Yan-
dell, 176 Okl. 550, 56 P.2d 835; Clark v. Lay-
man, 144 Kan. 711, 62 P.2d 89'7. Appellant's 
contention is without merit." 
In Simon v. State, 269 S. W. 95 (Tex. Cr. App. 
1925) , the defendant was charged with forgery of 
a check. In affirming, the court, by way of dicta, 
stated: 
"A check, although the name of the payee 
is left bl1ank, may be the subject of forgery, 
because, if genuine and delivered in such con-
dition, it carries with it authority for the 
holder to write in the name of the party e~­
titled to receive the money called for by It. 
* * * Also an instrument payable only to bear· 
er is the subject of forgery." 
In Sfctte v. Grider, 284 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1955), 
the Wyoming Supreme Court reached a similar con· 
clus'ion, ruling that the delivery of a promissory note 
10 
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with the payee's name left blank was still the sub-
ject of forgery. The court relied upon People v. 
Gorham, supra, and stated : 
"• • • The fact that the California case in-
volved a check and the case at bar involves a 
promissory note does not, in our judgment, 
n1ake . any difference. The principle involved 
is the same. The objection in this connection 
therefore must be overruled." 
Consequently, it appears clear that the weight 
of authority considering similar situations woul'd 
affirm the instant conviction and rule S-1 to be a 
bearer instrument. 
B.-2. Section 44-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"Where an instrument is wanting in any 
material particular the person in possession 
thereof has prima facie authority to complete 
it by filling up the 'blanks therein. And a sig-
nature on a blank paper delivered by the per-
son making the signature in order that the 
paper may be converted into a negotiable in-
strument operates as prima facie authority to 
fill it up as such for any amount. * * *" 
This court has recognlized the right of one re-
ceiving a negotiable instrument to fill in appro-
priate blanks. Plesc·ia v. Humphries, 121 Utah 355, 
2-!1 P.2d 1124 ( 1952). Recently in Hanson v. Bee-
hive Scc1u·ity Co., 14 Utah 2d .... , 380 P.2d 66 
( 1963), this court recognized the power of a person 
to whom a deed is given, with the name of the 
, grantee left blank, to fill in the blank. The court 
11 
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was clear to point out that such an instrument was 
not void. By the same reasoning, it appears clear 
that where one makes out a check, leaving the name 
of the payee blank, the instrument is not void but 
still a check. Especially is this so where the Legis-
lature has granted the recipient authority to com-
plete the instrument. Consequently, at the time that 
S-1 was made out it was sufficiently complete to 
constitute a check within the meaning of 76-20-11, 
U.C.A. 19153. People v. Gorham, 9 Cal. App. 341, 
99 Pac. 391 ( 1908) ; State v. Grider, 284 P.2d 400 
(Wyo. 1955). 
C. Finally, it is submitted that even were the 
allegations of the appellant correct, his conduct 
would amount to an "attempt" to violate 76-20-11, 
U.C.A. 1953, and that this court could modify the 
judgment of the trial court to affirm ~a conviction 
for attempt and remand for sentence.< 1 > 
76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953, defines an attempt as: 
"Any act done with intent to commit a 
crime, and tending but railing to effect its 
commission, is an attempt to commit a crime. 
* * *" 
In the instant case the appellant represented 
to Mr. John Wilson that he was giving him a check 
(1) 77-42-3, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
.. The court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or 
Ol'der appealed from, and may set aside, affirm or modify any or 
all the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon such judgment 
or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial." 
1 ·~ ....
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(R-15). He in effect attempted to pass a ch~ck. His 
failure, if any, would be only the failure to fill in the 
name of the payee or for Mr. Wilson to complete the 
payee's name. Neither failure is such a failure 1as 
would render the crime impossible of commission, and 
his conduct would consequently constitute an attempt 
to commit the crime. 76-1-30, U.C.A. 1953; State v. 
Prince, 75 Utah 205, 284 Pac. 108 ( 1930) ; Model 
Penal Code, § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
Since an 'attempt to commit a crime is necessarily 
lesser included in the crime itself, State v. Blythe, 20 
Utah 378, 58 Pac. 1108 (1899), it would be proper 
to affirm a conviction for attempt. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has claimed a defense, which when 
examined against the reasoning of other courts and 
the general rules of commercial law, affords him no 
basis for reversal. It is a common commercial prac-
tice for checks to be written leaving a blank for the 
payee. Some companies prefer to name themselves as 
payee or a specific account; others prefer to give the 
instrument as wide a construction as possible and, 
therefore, treat a blank instrument as payable to 
bearer. Banks obviously operate under the same as-
sumption, as can be seen by the many civil cases so 
. holding. To rule to the contrary would not only be a 
1 minority position, but would do manifest injury to 
13 
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commerce. Consequently, the conviction should be af~ 
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE ~~ 
Chief Assistant Attorney General·.~~ .. · 
State Capitol Building :., 
Salt Lake City, Utah ": 
Attorne-ys for Respondent · 
14 
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